Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs) are currently in wide use in many applications, including surveillance, law enforcement, and a variety of military missions. As these systems are unmanned, they cannot be directly monitored, and cyberattacks can jeopardize the mission, the vehicle, and potentially lives and property. Given the potential severity of the consequences of security breaches, it is important to assess the vulnerabilities inherent in cyberphysical systems. This paper presents a method for modeling cyberphysical systems in order to evaluate robustness to cyberattacks. We also establish a metric to quantify attack severity: time till failure. We categorize intents and outcomes for typical attacks and perform numerical simulations to estimate the severity of attack combinations in order to identify critical areas of vulnerability. Our findings can be used to guide strategies for improving the security of UASs and other cyberphysical systems.
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I. Introduction
With the increasing complexity of the networked embedded control technology, unmanned aerial systems (UASs) have become vulnerable to many cyberattacks, and these vulnerabilities have not been thoroughly investigated. Many UASs rely solely on encryption of data channels to prevent cyberattack. 1 While data encryption is a key component of many security strategies, relying on it as the only defense against a cyberattack is misguided.
2 This is clearly demonstrated by the recent reports of a malware infection in UAS control systems at Creech Air Force Base and reports that foreign agents were able to gain complete command capability of the Landsat-7 and Terra EOS AM-1 satellites by targeting internet-connected ground control stations outside of the US. 3, 4 These incidents clearly demonstrate that it is possible for an attacker to compromise a ground station controlling a UAS. Since the attacker has application layer control at the source node in these cases, link layer encryption does not protect the UAS. There are also multiple sensor attacks that can be employed by an adversary to corrupt the state of a UAS without needing to break encryption. Examples of these attacks include spoofing GPS or ADS-B signals.
5, 6
If a UAS were to be compromised by a cyberattack, the consequences could be disastrous. When an individual UAS is compromised, it may fail to complete a potentially vital mission, such as active combat, combat support, military or law enforcement surveillance, fire fighting, or wilderness search and rescue. A compromised UAS may also leak intelligence information, as was the case in 2009 when Iraqi militants were able to view live video feeds from US military UASs. Finally, a compromised UAS poses a significant threat to human life and property if the attacker is able to access any on-board weapon systems or is able to use the vehicle itself as a kinetic weapon. These dangers are amplified when multiple UASs are formed into a network. As more vehicles are added to the network, the number of vulnerabilities that are available for an attacker to exploit increases. Additionally, the communication links formed between the nodes of this network provide new avenues of attack. With the opportunity to compromise more vehicles, the attacker also gains the ability to cause more damage than with a single vehicle.
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Attempting to analyze UAS vulnerabilities is a daunting task. A UAS is a cyberphysical system, 1, 8 and ensuring the security of a cyberphysical system requires analysis of the interactions between both the digital and physical components. Additionally, each UAS design is physically unique. The mass properties, propulsion system specifications, sensors, actuators, control system, and aerodynamics of the vehicle all contribute to the system dynamics. The unique dynamics of individual UASs contribute to the vulnerabilities of the system to cyberattack, making a generalized protection system very difficult to implement. A detailed study of UAS cyberattack vulnerabilities has not been previously conducted due to the varied nature of the problem and the lack of a well defined measure of attack severity.
In this paper we identify attack scenarios that exemplify typical attack vectors in a UAS system. We then investigate how these attacks can be combined to form more sophisticated attack strategies. Due to the complicated nature of the cyberphysical system, we have not yet developed analytical models capable of predicting the vulnerabilities discovered numerically through simulation.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• A measure for attack severity has been created in Section II. This measure, time till failure, is the amount of time the system operates within the mission and flight envelope.
• A model of a typical UAS cyberphysical system has been created in Section III. The model employs JSBSim, a C++ flight dynamics model library to model the aircraft dynamics. It utilizes the Scicos block diagram environment to model control, guidance, and navigations sytems as well as cyberattacks.
• Typical cyberattack routes have been identified and vulnerabilities to combined cyberattacks have been investigated for a small UAS system in Section IV. The results were used to create a heat map of attack severity for various attack combinations.
Although UAS dynamics have not been previously studied in conjunction with cyberattacks in depth, many have investigated UAS flight envelope enforcement as a method of fail-safe recovery. [9] [10] [11] Currently, 33% of all UAS system failures are caused by the UAS exceeding its designed flight envelope. 9 Fault detection has also been employed in UASs to diagnose faults and react to them. 12 In addition, the effect of cyberattacks on the system survivability in a network has also been studied.
II. Cyberattack Measures

II.A. Attack Intent Classification
In this analysis we will investigate vulnerabilities of typical Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs). In this investigation, potential cyberattacks will be classified by the intent of the attacker as a way to motivate the different analytical techniques used to quantify the severity of the attack. The three intents that will be discussed are mission obstruction, control acquisition, and vehicle destruction. Through the modeling of a representative system and extensive testing, we will draw conclusions on these attacks.
• Mission Obstruction
In a mission obstruction attack, the objective of the attacker is to prevent the unmanned vehicle from completing the assigned mission objectives. There are several ways that this can be accomplished. For example, the vehicle can be delayed such that time requirement of the mission is not met, or the vehicle can be caused to waste so much fuel or battery power that the mission objectives are no longer feasible. Unpredictable errors could also be inserted into the navigation system in order to degrade the state awareness of the vehicle. A final possibility is that the control system could be corrupted to the point that its sensors begin to perform poorly, introducing issues such as highly oscillatory motion. One example we will consider leverages the collision avoidance system to obstruct the vehicle. By inserting a phantom vehicle in the path of the target vehicle, an attacker can cause the target vehicle to perturb it's flight path in order to avoid collision. It should be noted that in a mission obstruction attack, the attacker does not have the ability to control the vehicle directly. If the attacker can control the system directly, that will be considered a control acquisition attack.
• Control Acquisition
In a control acquisition attack, the objective of the attacker is to assume direct control of the vehicle. An example of this would be the use of GPS spoofing to shift the flight path of the UAS to suit the purposes of an attacker. For this type of attack, it may be possible for an attacker to have differing levels of control, i.e., an attacker may be able to gain control of vehicle subsystems without gaining control of the entire vehicle. If the attacker is able to gain complete control of a vehicle, there is a possibility of a man-in-the-middle attack. In this attack, the attacker would send falsified data to the original controller to make it appear that the vehicle is behaving normally, when it is actually being controlled by the attacker. Such an attack is especially dangerous, as having the attack be undetected provides a clear advantage to the attacker.
• Vehicle Destruction
The attacker's intent may be simply to destroy the vehicle. It is possible that an attacker would have sufficiently limited control over one state that they cannot perform a meaningful control acquisition attack, but they can still destroy the vehicle. For instance, if they have control of the altitude of the vehicle they may command the aircraft to fly into the ground. However, the primary area of danger, and thus the focus of this analysis for vehicle destruction attacks, will be the introduction of instability into the control and navigation system of the vehicle. An instability in this critical system will most likely result in a crash.
II.B. Failure Criteria
In order to determine whether or not a cyberattack has been successful, criteria for failure must be established. Based on the identified attack intents described above, two failure modes have been identified. They are described below. In order to quantify the severity of an attack, the metric we utilized was the time elapsed when any of these failure criteria were reached, referred to as time till failure.
• Mission Envelope Failure By defining parameters that define restrictions the user would like to place on the vehicle, the vehicle state can be compared to those parameters to determine if the mission envelope has been violated. The parameters identified in this study are summarized in Table 1 . 
Mission theater
Geographic region to which the UAS is to be confined to. Altitude window Range of acceptable vehicle altitudes. Battery/fuel level Amount of battery power and fuel that the vehicle must hold in reserve.
Target window
Geographic region that the vehicle should stay within during the specified time. Target time window The time period during which the vehicle must be within the target window.
• Flight Envelope Failure Flight envelope failure is defined as failure of the vehicle airframe. This type of failure typically leads to destruction of the vehicle.
III. UAS Cyberphysical Model
In this section, the configuration of the UAS testbed is presented along with the mathematical models of the on-board navigators and the estimation algorithm. The Purdue Hybrid Systems Lab simulation environment was employed for this analysis. The power of this environment is the ability to simulate highfidelity models using a proven C++ library while interfacing to a block diagram environment. A block diagram environment is very useful for the rapid prototyping and analysis of guidance, navigation and control systems. The current testbed has been utilized by the Purdue Hybrid Systems Lab for analysis of autonomous quadrotors, rovers, and fixed wing aircraft. Figure 1 illustrates the typical analysis process for the unmanned vehicles in the lab. In order to use the testbed, a vehicle description is first obtained using the wind tunnel if a physical model is available or the USAF Digital DATCOM software. Once the aerodynamics and mass properties of the vehicle are defined, JSBSim (a C++ flight dynamics model library) is used to simulate the vehicle. Next, ScicosLab (a software package similar to Simulink from MathWorks) interfaces with JSBSim. At this point, the block diagram environment within ScicosLab (Scicos) provides a mechanism for rapid analysis. The digital controller can then either be simulated in ScicosLab or implemented using the actual hardware of the unmanned system. Implementing the controller in software is called a software in the loop simulation (SIL), and using the actual hardware is called a hardware in the loop simulation (HIL). Telemetry data from the UAS can then be sent to ground station software to allow complete testing and verification of all user interactions with the unmanned system.
In Figure 2 , the complete Scicos block diagram used for this analysis is shown. In this diagram, the commands block provides the commanded waypoint and velocity to the vehicle, and the waypoint guidance block uses this information combined with information about nearby obstacles to compute a desired bearing and speed for the aircraft. The backside controller block implements digital PID controllers to regulate the error in the control surfaces. The servos block models the lag in the actuators using the first order transfer functions. The JSBSimComm block sends the actuator signals to JSBSim (the C++ flight dynamics library) where the aircraft state derivative is computed. The ScicosLab block then uses a variable step size integration scheme for propagating the state. The computed state and outputs from the JSBSimComm block are then sent to the sensor models. The sensor models use the state of the aircraft and random noise generation to simulate realistic data from the sensors. This data is then fed into the navigation system. The navigation system uses the sensor information to estimate the state of the aircraft. 
III.A. Aircraft
The aircraft analyzed in this paper is the MultiPlex Easy Star. This aircraft is widely used for UAS research. It is very stable, inexpensive, and durable. Due to the low cost and simplicity of the airframe, it was designed to fly without ailerons. Although this vehicle is the focus of analysis for this report, other aircraft can easily be evaluated in the same manner. This may be useful when designing a particular airframe to be robust to cyberattacks. 
III.B. Digital PID Controller
A digital PID controller is used to generate the control signals for the actuators. The controller in this analysis was updated at 50 Hz, which is the typical update rate for hobby servos commonly used on research UASs. This vehicle uses a backside control strategy, in which the elevator is used to control the velocity and the throttle is used to control the altitude. The elevator controls velocity by controlling angle of attack; therefore, this strategy works at both high and low flight speeds. In contrast, a frontside control strategy uses the throttle for velocity and the elevator for altitude. This approach is more complicated to implement in a control system because there is a gain reversal on the back side of the power required curve, requiring more throttle to go slower. 
III.C. GPS/INS Modeling
In order to evaluate the effects of malicious states changes in the navigation system, it is necessary to carefully construct a typical GPS/INS navigation system model. The dynamics of the inertial navigation system have to be derived as well as the models for sensor measurements. These non-linear models must all then be linearized in order to apply the typical Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) navigation methods.
III.C.1. Navigator Dynamics
The navigator state consists of the quaternions, the velocity in the navigation frame, and the global position.
Here we denote the quaternions as a, b, c, d, the north velocity as V N , the east velocity as V E , the downward velocity as V D , the latitude as L, the longitude as l, and the altitude as h. The full navigation state is given by
The navigator input vector consists of the measured body angular rates, ω x , ω y , ω z , and the measured accelerations, f x , f y , f z . Here x, y, z, represent a right handed coordinate frame fixed in the body with the x axis pointing forward and the y axis pointing out the right wing. Thus, the input to the navigator is given by:
T . Taking into account the rotational velocity of earth, Ω, and the distance from the center of earth R, the dynamics of the navigator are given by:
The nonlinear function f is defined in Equation 2 , where C nb is the direction cosine matrix from the body to the navigation frame, q nb is the attitude quaternion from the body to the navigation frame, ω nb is the angular velocity of the body frame with respect to the navigation frame, α b is the acceleration measured in the body frame, ω ie is the angular velocity of the earth with respect to the inertial frame, ω en is the angular velocity of the navigation frame with respect to the earth frame, g n is the acceleration of gravity expressed in the navigation frame, R is the radius of earth, × is the vector cross product, ⊗ is the skew operator, and V N V E V D are the components of the velocity in the navigation frame. 
III.C.2. GPS measurements
The GPS sensor measures the velocity and position related to the navigator's states. Let z GP S be the GPS measurement:
where v GP S is the zero-mean white Gaussian measurement noise with deterministic covariance. Usually, the GPS performance is given by the estimation errors of velocity, position and altitude measurement, which are denoted by the variance of Gaussian distributions:
A . Then, the covariance of the white noise can be calculated via:
III.C.3. IMU measurements
The IMU provides noisy measurements for the input U to the navigator dynamics, i.e.,
where v IM U is the zero-mean white Gaussian noise whose covariance R IM U is given by the product specification of the IMU.
III.C.4. Magnetometer measurements
To derive the nonlinear observation model for the magnetometer, we need to compute the local magnetic field. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) provides a software library that gives the magnetic inclination M I , and the declination M D of the magnetic field lines at the current location.
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Expressed in the north-east-down, frame the magnetic field vector [
T is given by:
Using the quaternion rotation to rotate this magnetic field unit vector into the frame of the aircraft, the nonlinear observation model of the magnetometer is given by:
where
and v mag is the zero-mean white Gaussian noise with covariance R mag specified by the magnetometer manufacturer. The Scicos block diagram magnetometer is shown in Figure 5 . The NOAA library used to compute M I and M D is contained in the geoMag block. The other components of the diagram use the vehicle attitude to rotate the magnetic field line given by the NOAA library into the frame of the aircraft. 
III.C.5. Extended Kalman Filter (EKF)
Combining Equations 1, 3, 5, and 7 yields the navigator system model:
T with the covariance matrix R = diag (R GP S , R mag ). With this model, the EKF can be applied to perform state estimation for the navigator. Letx be the state estimation and P be the estimate covariance. The algorithm consists of two steps: propagation and correction which are detailed as follows:
• Propagation: The propagation involves computing the evolution of the prior estimatex(t k−1 ) = x k−1|k−1 and P(t k−1 ) = P k−1|k−1 when there is no arrival of new observations. Let ∆t be the interpolation time interval of the continuous dynamics Equation 9 . The navigator's state estimate and its covariance can be updated using Equations 10 and 11 during the time interval from (k − 1)∆t till (k∆t):
where z k−1 IM U is the last measurement from the IMU and
is the Jaco-
• Correction: The correction step computes the posterior estimatex k|k and P k|k from the prior estimatê x k|k−1 =x(t k ) and P k|k−1 = P(t k ) by using the measurements from GPS and magnetometer. Since the GPS and magnetometer measurements are updated at different frequencies (GPS: 10Hz, magnetometer: 50 Hz), the correction steps may happen at different times. If the cross-correlation between the position and attitude states is neglected, a more computationally efficient algorithm results. This requires two separate EKFs where x := [x att x pos ] and P ≈ diag(P att , P pos ). Here
T and
T . This is a typical approximation in UASs. 17 Under this decomposition, the following equations can be used for GPS measurement correction: (12) where
is the Jacobian matrix of h GP S evaluated atx k−1|k−1 .
During the arrival of magnetometer measurements, the following equations can be used for correction:
is the Jacobian matrix of h mag evaluated atx k−1|k−1 .
Navigation System
Covariance Integration In the navigation system used for this analysis, one EKF is nested within another. The inner EKF fuses the attitude measurement data from the magnetometer with the integrated gyroscope rates from the inertial measurement unit (IMU). Outside this loop, the other EKF fuses the GPS position and velocity information with the integrated accelerations from the IMU. Note that the directions of these accelerations strongly depend on the attitude estimate of the inner loop.
III.D. ADS-B Modeling
ADS-B stands for Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast. This is a method of sharing data among aircraft in a vicinity through mutual information broadcasts. 
III.D.1. Data Packet
In this analysis, we will focus on the navigation information in the ADS-B broadcast. This includes the position and velocity of the aircraft. In the future, aircraft intent will be added. Other services exist for weather, terrain, and general flight information. 
III.D.2. Collision Avoidance Algorithm
Geodesic calculations for waypoint navigation were performed using the great-circle distance equations. The variables used for these calculations are defined in Table 3 . Collision avoidance was achieved using the velocity of the vehicle relative to the obstacle to move the obstacle into a static reference frame. Then the only requirement for avoiding collision is that the relative velocity be shifted such that it will not violate the separation distance. 18 The initial commanded bearing, Ψ v will always be chosen to point directly towards the commanded waypoint. If this bearing will cause the vehicle to violate the separation distance at any point in the future, a desired vehicle velocity relative to the obstacle will be calculated as:
β is calculated using trigonometric operations on a right triangle formed with the distance to the obstacle, r c , as the hypotenuse and the radius of the circle and vehicle path tangent to the separation window forming the legs. If the vehicle is within the separation window, this triangle cannot be formed and β is undefined. In this case, the relative velocity vector is chosen to be orthogonal to a collision course vector if the vehicle is in front of the obstacle and inside the separation window, and is chosen to point directly away from the obstacle if the vehicle is behind the obstacle and inside the separation window. If the separation distance is not violated, the direction of the relative velocity vector will be rotated such that it is tangent to the separation window in the case that the current relative velocity intersects the separation window. This rotation will be performed while keeping the vehicle's velocity constant, if possible.
IV. Simulated Cyberattacks
Single mode attacks are attacks in which only one attack avenue is pursued. The different types of identified single mode attacks are categorized in Table 4 . An attack that can't be detected.
When multiple single mode attacks are used on a target simultaneously, it is considered a combined attack. Successful combined attacks are especially dangerous because it gives an attacker additional degrees of freedom with which to achieve their objective. If an attack can be intelligently designed, these additional freedoms can be used to amplify the effect of the attack, reduce the detectability of the attack, and/or achieve a result that is not possible with a single attack. We will now simulate attacks of this type. We will determine which combinations of attacks are most dangerous and hypothesize the cause for the dangerous coupling. To provide a basis for testing, we will simulate the nominal case of an unmanned plane traveling to a waypoint.
The time till failure metric presented above will be used as the measurement of the effectiveness of the attack. The simulations were iterated using varying attack magnitudes, and the results are presented as a two dimensional contour map showing the time till failure. In these plots, the yellow and red colors represent the fastest failures, while blue colors represent delayed or no failure within the simulation time window.
In the first attack considered, the yaw rate sensor gain is varied from 80-120% and a sinusoid is inserted in the GPS longitude with a frequency varying from 0-30 Hz. The results of this simulation is shown in Figure 7 . The nominal operating point in this figure is at the center bottom. The yaw rate sensor gain creates vehicle instability with as little as 5% change in magnitude, although it is less sensitive to a change in gain that increases the measured value. Attenuation in the vehicle failure time begins to occur at a 10% increase in the gain. The GPS longitudinal frequency does contribute to system instability as can be seen by the narrowing of the center region of stability as the GPS frequency gets larger. It even causes failures at the nominal yaw rate gain for longitudinal frequencies near 7 Hz, possibly due to resonance at that point. As the frequency increases beyond this point, the effect it has on the system becomes less apparent. This is likely due to the higher frequency oscillations being filtered out by system poles. The next attack that is considered is an attack that varies the digital update rate from 50 to 100% and injects Gaussian noise with standard deviation varying from 0-1 f t/s 2 into the IMU accelerometer. The results of this attack are shown in Figure 8 . In this plot, the region of instability is fairly heterogeneous. If the processor is running at full speed (100%), the IMU accelerometer noise cannot drive the system unstable with noise less than 0.5 f t/s 2 . Interestingly, when the processor is running at 85%, no simulated accelerometer noise is able to introduce failure. In that sense, a cyberattack that reduces the processor to that rate actually increases the system's resillience to accelerometer noise. As the processor rate decreases, less IMU accelerometer noise is required to induce failure. At 50% processor speed and 0.5 f t/s 2 accelerometer noise there is an irregularity. It is possible that this is due to complex phenomenon such as harmonic resonances within the autopilot. It is also possible that this is an unlikely event that occurred in this simulation and would be homogenized with several Monte Carlo iterations. The next attack that is considered is Gaussian noise injection in both the IMU yaw gyroscope and the IMU accelerometer. The standard deviation of the gyroscope noise is varied from 0-10 rad/s, and the standard deviation of the accelerometer noise is varied from 0-1 f t/s 2 . The results of the simulation are shown in Figure 9 . The nominal point of zero noise in either sensor is in the lower left of the plot. It is clear from this plot that if the accelerometer noise is below 0.3 f t/s 2 that instability is not possible. Increasing the IMU yaw gyro noise standard deviation does not directly lead to increased stability. If the gyro noise is low, there is a large pocket of instability from 0.55 f t/s 2 to 1.0 f t/s 2 accelerometer noise standard deviation. Near 5 rad/s of yaw gyro noise the instability caused from the accelerometer noise is reduced. This complex behavior may again be caused by harmonic resonances in the system. A combination of three attacks is shown in Figure 10 . In this attack, noise is injected to the altitude measurement, a phantom ADS-B intruder is inserted and removed with varying frequency, and an initial navigator error in the down velocity is introduced. The failure region is fairly homogeneous except when the initial down velocity error is 50 ft/s, where an unstable pocket can be seen to develop. This pocket constitutes the smallest magnitude attack that causes instability. This case demonstrates the difficulty in protecting cyberphysical systems. The coupling between various system components is so complex that it is very difficult to intuit which attacks cause instability, and the existence of these isolated instability regions can make it very difficult to completely characterize the safe region. An undetectable attack is an attack that is not discovered by the fault monitoring systems, an attack that targets an unmonitored subsystem, or an attack that is able to induce an irrecoverable instability before being discovered by the monitoring systems. In Figure 11 , the GPS altitude noise is plotted against initial error in the navigator down velocity and the processor is running at 20% of the nominal speed. The 1 sigma, 2 sigma, and 3 sigma measurement ellipsoids are plotted. These ellipsoids represent the ability of the fault detection system to detect an attack. As the attack moves farther from the nominal point, the probability of the attack being detected increases. A disguised attack is an attack that is designed to be detected but identifies as a different type of attack. This false identification could cause the vehicle to perform fault mitigation actions that, while effective against the type of attack that was identified, can be leveraged by the actual attack to further its objectives. In this way, the vehicle's defense systems are themselves a vulnerability that can be exploited by an attacker. This type of attack requires a more detailed fault detection scheme for analysis and will be investigated in future work.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a simulation platform designed to test the robustness of UASs to cyberattack and identify their vulnerabilities. A high-fidelity model of the vehicle dynamics and autopilot was created and interfaced with a proven flight simulation software package, enabling accurate simulation of UAS operations. This capability was leveraged to simulate the response of a UAS to several identified cyberattacks and combinations of cyberattacks, including sensor noise injection, changing the system update rate, modifying sensor gains, and modifying the navigator state. These attacks were shown through simulation to be capable of impeding mission objectives and introducing instability into the vehicle, resulting in airframe failure. This capability, along with the great risk to life and property that a UAS crash presents, demonstrates the need for further development of cybersecure autopilots for UAS systems. For future study, we intend to further investigate fault detection systems that can identify and protect against specific cyberattacks, as well as methods to recover control of a vehicle that has been compromised by an attack.
